

# Elite Politics in Russia: Politburo 2.0?



**MINCHENKO**  
CONSULTING





- Graduate of Chelyabinsk State University in History (1993), Russian Academy of State Service in Political Psychology (1997).
- In 1993 began a career as a political consultant.
- 2004-2011 - advisor to the Chairman of State Duma Anti-Corruption Committee, expert of Security and CIS Countries Committees;
- Since 2010 to 2012 - member of Public Council in the Ministry of Industry and Trade and Expert Council of the Ministry of Economic Development. Since 2014 - member of Public Council in the Ministry of Energy.
- Board member of Russian Association of political consultants. The member of IAPC (International Association of political consultants).
- TOP-10 & TOP-20 of Russian political consultants (according to “Vedomosti” newspaper & “Obschaya Gazeta”).
- First place for Minchenko consulting in the rank of major players in Russian political consulting (according to “Kompaniya” magazine, 2011).
- First place on popularity among political analysts rated by Russian journalists (survey of Znak.com, 2013).
- Moscow State University, Faculty of World Politics, Lecturer.
- Author of 2 books.

## Companies of the holding:



PR-agency «New Image». Since 1993



International Institute for Political  
Expertise (IIPE). Since 2003




Government Relations agency  
«Minchenko GR Consalting». Since  
2007

## Our projects geography

- Belorussia;
- Georgia;
- European Union;
- Kazakhstan;
- Kyrgyzstan;
- Moldova;
- USA;
- Uzbekistan;
- Ukraine;
- Turkmenistan;
- Regions of Russian Federation: Republic of Bashkortostan, Sakha, Tatarstan, Udmurtia, Khakassia, Krasnoyarsk, Perm, Primorye, Amur, Arkhangelsk, Volgograd, Irkutsk, Kirov, Kurgan, Leningrad, Magadan, Moscow, Novgorod, Orenburg, Pskov, Samara, Sverdlovsk, Tver, Tyumen, Nizhni Novgorod, Chelyabinsk, the Yamal- Nenets autonomous region, the Chukotka autonomous region, the Khanty-Mansi autonomous region, Saint-Petersburg and Moscow..





### 1990 years. Feudal lobbying



- Staffing lobbying. Pushing loyal people into the power. Oligarchs are inside the state power;
- Investments in politicians with special attention to governors elections and parliament elections;
- Bargaining zone of power-business interaction. Powerful tool – media resources were controlled by tycoons;
- Bargaining zone of federal power and regional powers interaction;
- Political consultant as a figure is more effective than a lobbyist.



### Eltsin's balance of power

- Family;
- Oligarchs (7 bankers);
- Gazprom;
- Moscow group;
- National republics;
- Siloviki;
- Liberal clan.

## 2000 years. Enforcement lobbying

- Redistribution of resources in favor of "siloviki" elite group (law enforcement officials corporation);
- Dismantlement of media empires controlled by tycoons;
- Elimination of regional regimes free will. End of governors - political heavyweights power;
- Main actors - state corporations and elite clans. Center of decision making — variant of Soviet structure Politburo. Procedure — making a cross-clan balance. Main stake is made on creation of economic sector leaders and corporation as a national champions.




- Politburo 2.0 works as a network structure. It is an informal agency and there is no formalization of its functions such as general meetings.
- Sectoral branches are distributed among its members and they offer their management schemes within their competence.




- This is the model of resource redistribution and preservation of stable elite groups and the future consolidation of these groups governance system.
- **The key persons** – Politburo 2.0 members - do not fall out of the Putin orbit. These people remain as the key decision makers in the Government. There is staff turnover in the Government so as in the regions but the Politburo 2.0 holds levers of control tightly.

**Putin's team: stages of formation and self-determination**




**Groups merged with the Putin's team:**



**Groups opposing the Putin's team:**





V. Putin

S. Shoygu

I. Sechin

S. Chemezov

V. Volodin

S. Ivanov

G. Timchenko

Y. Kovalchuk

A. Rotenberg

S. Sobyanin

D. Medvedev



Candidates for Politburo 2.0 members

The Power Block

A. Bortnikov  
 V. Kolokolcev  
 Y. Chaika  
 E. Shkolov  
 A. Bastrikin  
 V. Ivanov  
 E. Murov  
 V. Zolotova  
 N. Patrushev  
 M. Fradkov  
  
 V. Lebedev

The Political Block

A. Gromov  
 D. Peskov  
  
 Patriarch Kirill  
  
 V. Surkov  
  
 A. Kudrin  
 A. Voloshin  
 A. Chubaic

System opposition

V. Zhirinovskiy  
 G. Zuganov  
 M. Prokhorov  
 S. Mironov

Business

G. Gref  
 P. Abramovich  
 V. Yakunin  
 A. Miller  
 V. Potanin  
 O. Deripaska  
 M. Fridman  
 A. Usmanov  
 V. Vekselberg  
 V. Alekperov  
 A. Mordashev  
 A. Kostin  
 O. Sienko

The Technical Block (Central Committee Secretary)

I. Shuvalov  
 E. Nabiullina  
 V. Kozhin  
 D. Kozak  
 S. Lavrov  
 A. Vaino  
 A. Belousov  
 V. Khristenko  
  
 S. Narishkin  
 V. Matvienko

Regional Leaders

A. Beglov

R. Kadirov

R. Minnikhanov


A. Khloponin

Y. Trutnev





If in previous "Politburo 2.0" reports the Russian authorities orbits were represented in the bipolar coordinate system with two poles of elites attraction (the leader of conditional government hardliners so called "siloviki" Igor Sechin and Dmitry Medvedev as the leader of "system liberals"), then now in the current realities due to significant weakening of the liberal authorities positions seems to be more adequate sectoral view (see below pie chart "Orbits of the Russian authorities").





- In the area of President Vladimir Putin special personal control remains energy sectors, foreign policy, defense and the defense industry, law enforcement agencies.
- Responsibility for domestic politics, social policy, the financial sector and infrastructure projects distributed among the Politburo 2.0 members.

## Inside «Politburo 2.0»

- The dismantling process of the duumvirate elements from the period of Medvedev's presidency in 2008-2012 is completed;
- Ex-President by 2013 finally became a technical prime minister with limited terms of reference primarily centered around the social unit;
- Alternative to the new position of Dmitry Medvedev has publicly delineated - the transition into the "experts" category;
- The new position as noted in our last year reports "On the eve of elite groups reboot" and "Year of the Medvedev Government" facilitates his survival as Prime Minister;
- It is important to note that the influence of his apparatus key opponent for many years Igor Sechin diminished in the symmetric manner , his role as the counterweight for strong figure Dmitry Medvedev is no longer in demand.



- Resource potential reduction of the groups who tried to position themselves as communicators with the West elites and supporters of the "liberal" ideology.
- New types of resources requested by Putin:
  - Symbolic image;
  - Contacts with alternative to the West foreign players.

Level	SIGNIFICANT GROWTH OF INFLUENCE	STABILITY	DECREASE IN INFLUENCE
Politburo 2.0 members	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ S. Shoygu</li> <li>▪ S. Ivanov-C. Chemezov</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ G. Timchenko-Y. Kovalchuk</li> <li>▪ V. Volodin</li> <li>▪ I. Sechin</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ D. Medvedev</li> <li>▪ S. Sobyenin</li> <li>▪ Rotenbergs</li> </ul>
Candidates to the Politburo 2.0 members	<p>Power block (as a corporation)</p> <p>Financial triangle «Nabiullina-Gref-Kostin»</p> <p>A. Bortnikov</p> <p>R. Kadyrov</p> <p>Federal Protective Service (FSO)</p>	<p>«Krasnoyarsk Group»</p> <p>R. Minnikhanov</p>	<p>The Old Family</p> <p>«System Liberal Group»</p> <p>A. Kudrin</p>

Putin has created the checks and balances system among the elite within the key areas and industries. In fact encouraged conflict pairs:

### In economics

- Sechin-Timchenko (energetics)
- Kovalchuks-Rotenbergs (infrastructure)
- Keynesian Group-Monetarism Group
- Triumvirate «Nabiullina-Gref-Kostin»-Belousov

### In the Power area:

- Kolokolcev-Shkolov
- Bastrykin-Chaika
- Patrushev-Bortnikov

### Foreign Policy:

- Lavrov-Ushakov



- Stable position of business that is close to Putin;
- All the sanction victims received and will receive compensation in the form of new orders and direct financial support in the banking sector;
- In essence we have a new legitimation model of resource redistribution from one elite groups to the benefit of others.

- **Power in Moscow.** Participants: S. Sobyenin and his team against Elite Coalition. Winner: Elite Coalition;
- **RAS.** Participants: Chemezov, Medvedev, Kovalchuks. Winner: Kovalchuks;
- **Power in Saint-Petersburg.** Participants: Kovalchuks, Rotenbergs. Winner: Rotenbergs;
- **Bridge to Crimea.** Participants: Timchenko, Rotenberg. Winner: 50/50.



## August 2012

	Medvedev	Sechin	Ivanov	Chemezov	Volodin	Kovalchuk	Timchenko	Sobyanin	Total
Closeness to Putin	6	7	7	8	4	8	9	5	54
Informal influence	3	9	5	7	4	8	8	4	48
Finance	4	4	2	6	1	7	8	4	36
Regional elites	2	3	4	4	7	2	3	5	30
Formal administrative	8	3	7	3	6	3	0	4	34
Symbolic & Image resources	6	4	4	3	2	1	1	5	26
Media	4	1	4	1	6	5	2	2	25
Political & party resources	7	1	3	2	7	1	1	2	24
Law enforcement resources	3	7	3	3	1	1	1	2	21
External resources	4	3	1	2	0	0	0	0	10
<b>Total</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>308</b>

January 2013

	Medvedev	Ivanov	Chemezov	Volodin	Shoygu	Timchenko	Kovalchuk	Sobyanin	Sechin	Total
Closeness to Putin	6	7	8	5	6	9	7	6	6	60
Informal influence	3	5	7	4	3	9	8	4	7	50
Finance	5	2	6	1	2	8	7	5	5	41
Regional elites	2	5	4	8	4	5	2	5	2	37
Formal administrative	7	7	3	5	4	1	3	4	2	36
Media	4	4	1	7	4	2	5	3	1	31
Symbolic & Image resources	4	4	3	2	6	1	1	4	4	29
Political & party resources	5	3	3	7	3	1	1	2	1	26
Law enforcement resources	2	4	4	1	5	1	1	2	4	24
External resources	5	1	2	0	1	0	0	0	2	11
<b>Total</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>345</b>


## January 2014


	Ivanov	Shoygu	Volodin	Timchenko	Kovalchuk	Chemezov	Rotenberg	Sechin	Medvedev	Sobyanin	Total
Closeness to Putin	8	7	5	9	7	6	8	5	6	5	66
Informal influence	7	5	5	9	8	7	8	6	3	4	62
Finance	2	4	1	8	7	7	7	7	3	5	51
Regional elites	7	5	9	4	2	4	3	3	2	4	43
Formal administrative	8	4	5	1	4	3	3	2	6	4	40
Media	4	4	7	2	7	1	1	1	3	3	33
Symbolic & Image resources	4	6	4	1	1	3	1	2	3	3	28
Political & party resources	3	3	7	1	1	3	0	1	4	1	24
Law enforcement resources	3	5	1	1	1	4	1	3	1	2	22
External resources	3	1	0	4	2	2	2	3	2	0	19
<b>2014 Total</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>388</b>


October 2014


	Ivanov	Shoygu	Volodin	Timchenko	Chemezov	Kovalchuk	Sechin	Rotenberg	Medvedev	Sobyanin	Total
Closeness to Putin	8	8	6	9	6	7	6	8	5	5	68
Informal influence	7	6	5	9	7	8	8	8	2	3	63
Finance	2	5	1	8	7	7	6	7	3	5	51
Regional elites	7	5	7	5	4	2	3	3	2	3	41
Formal administrative	8	4	5	1	4	4	2	2	5	4	39
Media	4	4	8	2	3	7	1	1	3	4	37
Symbolic & Image resources	4	8	4	2	3	1	3	0	2	3	30
Political & party resources	3	3	8	1	3	1	1	0	5	1	26
Law enforcement resources	4	6	1	1	4	1	3	1	1	2	24
External resources	4	1	0	5	2	2	4	1	2	0	21
<b>2014 Total</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>400</b>


Politburo 2.0 member	August 2012: position in the Politburo 2.0	January 2013: position in the Politburo 2.0	January 2014: position in the Politburo 2.0	October 2014: position in the Politburo 2.0
Medvedev	1	1	7-9	9-10
Sechin	2	9	7-9	7
Ivanov	3	2	1	1
Chemezov	4	3	4-6	4-5
Volodin	5	4	2-3	3
Kovalchuk	6	7-8	4-6	6
Timchenko	7-8	6	4-6	4-5
Sobyanin	7-8	7-8	10	9-10
Shoygu	n/a	5	2-3	2
Rotenberg	n/a	n/a	7-9	8




























- We can observe overheating inside the Politburo 2.0;
- Resource amount concentrated in the hands of Politburo members is increasing. This includes both the power resource and the economic;
- At the same time the amount of distributable resource is decreasing;
- In this regard cleaning inside the Politburo 2.0 (at least at the candidates level) is inevitable. The situation with Evtushenkov demonstrates that.



Silovik?



Sergey Ivanov  
(head of Presidential administration)



Sergey Shoygu  
(Minister of defence)

Technocrat?



Sergey Sobyenin  
(mayor of Moscow)



Rustam Minnikhanov  
(head of Tatarstan)

Liberal?



Alexey Kudrin  
(ex deputy prime minister)



German Gref  
(CEO, Sberbank)





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