Foto: Mikhail Klimentyev, RIA Novosti

Is the recent reshuffle in the federal and some regional governments evidence of the president’s new personnel policy?

No, I wouldn’t describe it as a new personnel policy, because the reshuffle has not brought any new people to power. There have been some changes, but for example, Putin inherited his new defense minister, Sergei Shoigu, from Russia’s first president, Boris Yeltsin. So it cannot be said that Putin is bringing in new personnel.

It would be more accurate to say that Putin has changed his policy toward his team. In my opinion, he has come to see that abuses of power and corruption have grown to a scale that threatens the survival of the regime. The recent corruption cases are a signal for the elite that they should temper their appetites or risk imprisonment.

Does this mean that no one is untouchable and corruption will be persecuted even within Putin’s inner circle? Do these high-profile resignations and their broad coverage by the media reflect the public mood?

I think that everything you have said is correct, to a greater or lesser extent. Serdyukov was one of Putin’s most trusted attendants. It is also clear that society has an extremely negative attitude toward corruption. However, the media campaign for the authorities’ anti-corruption initiatives has not been effective. Take the recent examples of the decision that drivers who are stopped for speeding will not be fined directly by traffic police, but based on video footage of their offences, or the simplified procedure for the issue of documents. They show that the scale of corruption has decreased at the lowest level.

But a real battle must not be limited to media campaigns against some individuals in power. It must include the creation of conditions for significantly reducing, if not defeating, corruption, which has not yet been completely eradicated anywhere in the world. In this context, I’d like to draw your attention not to these high-profile criminal cases, but to the law on checking the incomes of state officials and their families against their expenses.

Still, returning to these high-profile cases, could the resignations that we witnessed past month be a result of the struggle between groups of influence within the elite?

It is obvious that the fight among the elite has a major part to play in all of this. Former Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov had many enemies. He not only had a personal conflict with former Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov, but also a number of managerial conflicts with the financial group in the Russian establishment, in particular Alexei Kudrin when he was finance minister and Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov.

Serdyukov was also fighting Russian Technologies head Sergei Chemezov for control over weapons procurement, and he was at loggerheads with generals and his predecessor, Sergei Ivanov. As you know, it is impossible to wage a war on several fronts simultaneously for a long time, let alone win it.

The media are writing about the embezzlement case at Rosagroleasing, in which former Agriculture Minister Yelena Skrynnik is allegedly involved. Do you think that this conflict is part of the war between elite groups?

The situation is crystal clear. Viktor Zubkov was at war with Yelena Skrynnik, and her retirement has made her an easy target.

Has Putin managed to regain the role of arbiter in the wars among the elite after being elected for a third term? Has he restored the balance?

No, no such balance currently exists. If we use the Politburo 2.0 concept to consider the Russian political, business and power elite, we will see that the status of Sergei Shoigu has grown considerably, as he has risen from a candidate member to a full member of the Politburo. In general, the “securocracy” part of the president’s team has gained considerable strength, but there is still a long way to go to achieve real balance.

As for the energy sector, the triangle of Igor Sechin, Gennady Timchenko and Gazprom is unstable. Although Sechin and Timchenko seem to have ironed out their differences, the war between them may resume soon, because it is rooted in the existing system of distribution of energy and funds. Besides, the struggle calling for Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller's resignation has gained momentum, and there is a long line of candidates for his post.

And lastly, there is a major battle underway against Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev.

Medvedev has recently told the French media that he may run for president again. How serious is this statement? Does he stand a chance if he decides to run?

I think that his chances of returning to the Kremlin have diminished recently, and his statements are due to his feeling of instability as prime minister and a desire to prove that he is a political heavyweight. At this point, I think Medvedev’s chances are small.

Do you think Putin has a large pool of reserve candidates? I ask because you said that he “inherited” Shoigu from Yeltsin.

There are several groups of managers who can be seen as alternatives to the St. Petersburg team. Firstly, there is Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin, who had been chief of the government’s and the president’s staff and has his own circle of gravitational influence, so to speak. Secondly, there is Sergei Shoigu and his team. Thirdly, there is a tightly-knit group from Krasnoyarsk, including former Governor Alexander Khloponin, who is currently the president’s envoy in the North Caucasus, billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov, Deputy Prime Minister Olga Golodets, Energy Minister Alexander Novak and several other figures.

The last question concerns social mobility mechanisms. Many experts say that they are not working in Russia.

Yes, they are right.

The members of the elite you have mentioned became part of the power system long ago or were wealthy business people before they took up politics. Do you think personnel renewal is possible in the current system?

Yes, of course. I suggested the formula to the President’s Executive Office more than once. It includes gubernatorial elections, the liquidation of the municipal filter [the municipal stamp of approval] for the parties represented in the federal parliament and in regional legislatures, as well as the election of the Federation Council and the revival of single-seat districts for State Duma elections.

In this way, the government would allow active and ambitious people to prove their worth through the election procedure, and we will see new faces in power within three or four years. There is no other option.

As I see it, Vladimir Putin has come to the same conclusion, possibly after reading expert analyses or on his own. He has recently said that it would be worth considering the revival of direct elections to the Federation Council. 

MINCHENKO, Yevgeny

Valdai International Discussion Club